To look and (not) see: Predicting the detection of automation failures based on eye movements of human operators by Bruder, Carmen et al.
To look and (not) see:  
Predicting the detection of automation failures based on 
the eye movements of human operators 
 
Carmen Bruder 
German Aerospace Center 
(D.L.R.) Aviation and Space 
Psychology 
Hamburg, Germany  
+49 40 513096 61 
carmen.bruder@dlr.de 
 
 
Paul Weber  
German Aerospace Center 
(D.L.R.) Aviation and Space 
Psychology 
Hamburg, Germany 
 
 
 
 
Catrin Hasse 
German Aerospace Center 
(D.L.R.) Aviation and Space 
Psychology 
Hamburg, Germany  
+49 40 513096 68 
catrin.hasse@dlr.de  
 
  
ABSTRACT 
In order to detect automation failures in time, operators are 
required to monitor automated systems efficiently. The 
present study analyzed eye movements to predict whether 
or not subjects would detect an automation failure. Eye 
movements were recorded whilst subjects were monitoring 
an automated system where automation failures sometimes 
occur. The data imply that the eye movements of human 
operators effectively differ between operators who detect 
the automation failure and those who miss it. The findings 
are discussed in the context of personnel selection and 
incident reporting as used in air traffic control (ATC). 
Keywords 
Automation, monitoring, automation failures, eye 
movements, aviation, personnel selection 
INTRODUCTION 
Human-machine systems in aviation are mostly automated 
in many aspects. According to research on the future of 
aviation, such as the Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR) Program, such developments mean the nature of 
human roles and tasks will inevitably change [22, 23]. 
Workshops with experienced pilots and air traffic 
controllers, which were conducted in order to gather their 
expectations about future tasks, roles, and responsibilities, 
indicated that monitoring in a highly automated workplace 
will pose challenges to future operators in aviation [5].  
Automation failures occur even though the systems are 
becoming more and more reliable. If an automation failure 
happens, the human operator is asked to detect this failure 
efficiently. That is one of the ironies of automation as 
described by Bainbridge [1]. If the operator fails to identify 
the system failure, serious consequences can occur.  
With respect to personnel selection, training, and incident 
reports, reliable eye-movement indicators could be useful 
for predicting whether or not a human operator perceives 
the automation failure. To select candidates who supervise 
automated systems efficiently, physiological indicators for 
failure detection performance would be a perfect 
complement to current tests based on behavioral indicators.  
Finally physiological indicators could provide additional 
information in incident reports as used in ATC to classify 
human errors [e.g. 24, 19], to shed some light into the 
“black box” of cognitive processes. For example, eye 
movement indicators would help to classify the human 
error according to the Rasmussen performance levels [18], 
i.e. whether an automation failure was not perceived or it 
was perceived but not detected or reported. Lundberg et al. 
used unobtrusive eye tracking within a field experiment to 
explain loss of separation events over Swedish air space in 
2011 [17]. They suggested that it is hard for air traffic 
controllers to handle the trade-off between spending visual 
scan time on conflict detection and simultaneously 
examining potential conflicts identified by the conflict 
detection automation [17].     
Detecting automation failures  
Automation failures occur in many ways. To name just a 
few of the failure types, automated systems can fail to 
perform an action, execute an action incorrectly, or do so at 
a wrong time. Analogously, Hollnagel (2000) defined 
categories of actions, such as correctly performed actions, 
erroneous execution, commission, and omission [14]. As 
the task of human operators is to supervise an automated 
system, errors of omission and commission can occur. 
Hollnagel (2000, p. 138) defined an error of omission as 
“the failure of carrying out an action during the time 
window when it was required” [14]. An error of 
commission is when an operator performs an inappropriate 
action to achieve the goal.  
With respect to highly automated systems, an error of 
omission happens when the human operator does not detect 
the automation failure in time. Since human attention is 
limited and human-machine systems are often complex, 
human operators need to monitor the automated system, i.e. 
allocate their attention adequately and switch between 
targets dynamically.  
Monitoring automated systems  
Billings (1997, p. 198) explained that operators in aviation 
“must closely monitor the behavior of their automated 
systems, but if an anomaly occurs, they must sometimes 
take very prompt action [2].” The increase in automation 
requires operators who can monitor in such a way as to 
enable them to detect automation failures in time and to 
take control if automation fails [8]. That is very important 
for situations where the automated system provides no 
warning when an automation failure occurs. 
Wickens et al. [27] concluded that automation might affect 
system performance as new skills may be required, and that 
human operators might not have been adequately selected 
and trained for these changes. Therefore in order to prepare 
for the future selection and training of aviation operatives, 
it is imperative to understand the task of monitoring. 
Operational monitoring comprises using one’s senses to 
follow meaningful information from an automated system 
responsibly, even when there is no direct need for action. It 
involves being prepared to take control of a system at any 
time, for example in case of malfunction [8]. 
Measuring monitoring with eye movements       
A variety of studies support the idea that eye movements 
offer an appropriate means for measuring the efficient and 
timely acquisition of visual information [e.g. 9, 16, 25, 26, 
for an overview see 15]. Based on this research, eye 
movement parameters were identified which reflect the 
human monitoring performance [10]. These parameters 
were associated with accurate failure detection [11], 
accurate manual control in case of automation failure [13]. 
Hasse et al. examined monitoring behavior as a team task 
[12]. Bruder et al. [4] investigated the link between eye 
movement parameters and the monitoring behavior of 
experts, and also compared the monitoring behavior of 
experts with novices [5]. Grasshoff et al. [10] predicted 
more than 53% of the variance of the failure detection 
performance by means of eye tracking parameters. When 
comparing existing selection procedures with eye tracking 
measurements of job applicants it could be shown that 
monitoring performance refers mainly to something like a 
complex skill, requiring and incorporating attentional 
planning processes [10].  
Though the results of previous studies revealed valuable 
insights into eye movements during the process of 
monitoring, they failed to show how the scanning behavior 
of operators during the detection of automation failures can 
be described in contrast to situations where operators fail to 
detect automation failures. In the present study, the eye 
movement behavior was traced in more detail, i.e. with 
respect to specific monitoring behavior around the 
automation failure. 
In the present study, monitoring patterns for accurate 
failure-detection and missed automation failures were 
compared. In principle, this combination can arise in four 
different forms:  
• If an automation failure is monitored and detected, the 
eye movement patterns for successful failure detection 
are identified.  
• If the automation failure is not monitored and not 
detected, eye movement patterns for the error of 
omission are found. 
• If the automation failure is monitored but not detected, 
it is the looking-but-not-seeing effect.  
• Finally, the automation is not monitored but detected, 
which is caused by peripheral target detection [7]. 
The looking-but-not-seeing effect as a principle of 
inattentional blindness is a major side effect of top-down 
processing, where targets unrelated to the specific task are 
not monitored [20]. The looking-but-not-seeing effect 
could result from performing parallel tasks, which is 
common when dealing with complex automated systems. 
Human operators performing another task look but do not 
recognize information unrelated to the task they are 
currently occupied with [6]. The looking-but-not-seeing 
effect could also be a side effect of top-down processing, as 
human operators overlook a target if they do not expect it 
[21]. 
With the looking-but-not-seeing effect and the peripheral 
target detection in mind, the following research questions 
should be addressed here:  
1. To what extent can the detection of automation failures 
be predicted by the corresponding eye movements?  
2. How strong is the looking-but-not-seeing effect?   
 
METHOD  
An empirical study requiring the monitoring of an 
automated system was undertaken with applicants for jobs 
in aviation.  
Simulation tool  
A simulation tool called Monitoring Test (MonT) was 
designed to measure the monitoring performance of 
applicants for future jobs in aviation who have no prior 
experience as a pilot or an air traffic controller. For this 
purpose, a simplified and abstract simulation of traffic flow 
was developed. MonT therefore depicts the basic processes 
involved in monitoring rather than presenting an 
ecologically valid traffic situation. The same monitoring 
abilities are, however, required to complete the tasks 
successfully (see Figure 1).  
As this tool presents a simplified and abstract simulation of 
traffic flow, it was appropriate for use with test subjects 
who have no prior experience as a pilot or air traffic 
controller. The simulation consisted of two separate 
systems namely the top system and the bottom system, 
which were fully identical but operated entirely 
independently of one another. They were both represented 
on the same screen. Each system contained two areas that 
represented storage space where an actual and a target 
value were displayed, as well as two entries and two exits.  
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Figure 1. MonT (Monitoring Test), important elements labelled. 
Objects entered the system through one of the entry points 
and then moved along the connections between the entry, 
area, and exit. These connections consisted of segments. 
Objects moved forward one segment per time unit, which 
comprised three seconds. Objects entering an area were 
either stored in this area or were forwarded to the 
corresponding connection. In both cases the current value 
of the area was updated automatically.  
The objects were controlled automatically, i.e. the decision 
whether an object should enter an area or move to a 
corresponding connection was made by the automated 
system. The automated system indicated the number of 
objects that should be forwarded by using the input fields. 
The task of the automated system was to bring all actual 
values into agreement with target values. Automation 
failures could happen whenever objects entered an area. 
Three types of failures were distinguished: 
• The automated system failed to send objects onward. 
• The automated system sent the wrong number of objects. 
• The automated system sent objects at the wrong time. 
Task of the test subject 
The test subject’s task was to monitor the automated 
system and report any automation failures as soon as they 
were recognized. In order to decide whether or not a failure 
had occurred, the test subject had to learn the rules of the 
automatic system as well as the different types of failures 
that could happen (see above). The test subject was 
required to report failures by clicking on the input fields 
that were incorrectly edited by the automated system. 
Frequency and response time were analyzed. 
Design of monitoring scenarios 
For experimental purposes, as well as for the long-term 
objective of using the scenarios for personnel selection and 
training, scenarios presented a variety of failures rather 
than simulating real conditions. The monitoring task 
consisted of six scenarios; a single automation failure 
happened in two scenarios and three or four automation 
failures happened in two scenarios. In the other two 
scenarios, the automatic system worked accurately (two 
distractor scenarios).  
Each scenario lasted two to three minutes, beginning with 
an orientation phase where the display was frozen. The 
duration of the orientation phase was fixed and lasted 15 
seconds. After finishing the orientation phase, the 
simulation started flowing dynamically. 
Eye-tracking equipment 
Each subject was seated in front of a 19-inch LCD 
computer display at a distance of approximately 60 cm (see 
Figure 2). The LCD display had a refresh rate of 60 Hz, 
contrast ratio of 2000:1, lag of 2ms, and a resolution of 
1280 x 1024 pixels. Eye movements were remotely 
recorded by the binocular Eyegaze Analysis System and the 
‘Bright Pupil Method’, manufactured by LC Technologies, 
Inc. The system operated at 120 Hz and was combined with 
the simulation tool MonT to ensure that both systems used 
the same timestamp. 
 
Figure 2. Eye tracking equipment and calibration  
Management of raw data was conducted by NYAN 
software. The fixation-detection algorithm was set with a 
minimum sample for fixation detection of six gazes on a 
particular screen point – within the deviation threshold of 
25 pixels. All successive fixations falling on an AOI (area 
of interest) were categorized as “gaze duration”. 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted with a sample of 101 
applicants, 71 for air traffic control training at DFS 
(Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH) and 30 for pilot training 
at DLH (Deutsche Lufthansa). They were 17 to 27 years 
old (M=20.00, SD=2.36) and 69.5% were male. 84% 
claimed to have experience with computer games. The 
computer experience was rated on a Likert scale from 1 (no 
experience) to 5 (very experienced) with an average of 3.9 
(SD=.67, ‘experienced’). Experiments were conducted in 
conjunction with the regular selection process at the 
German Aerospace Center without influencing the selection 
outcome. Subjects received 25 € for their participation in 
the two hour experiment. 
Procedure  
Two subjects performed the experiment at the same time, 
but each with a separate computer and eye-tracking system. 
A room divider was installed between the subjects to 
prevent visual contact between them. After providing 
subjects with a demographic questionnaire, they were 
instructed to perform the monitoring task. Before the 
monitoring scenarios were presented, subjects performed a 
knowledge test and four exercises. At the end, the subjects 
completed two questionnaires measuring their complacency 
potential and their attitude towards technology. Finally 
subjects were asked about their impressions of the 
experiment. 
Measurements 
Two instances of failure detection were separated: A failure 
was detected successfully if a subject reported this failure 
by clicking on the input fields that were incorrectly edited 
by the automated system. A failure was missed if the 
subject did not report the failure within the corresponding 
timeframe.   
Defining relevant AOIs 
The definition of relevant AOIs was directly connected to 
the automation failures and the operations of the automatic 
system that encounter an automation failure (see Figure 3).  
Perceiving these AOIs at the right time should indicate 
ideal monitoring behavior and provide the subject with the 
ability to detect automation failures. As a first step, AOIs 
were determined for every monitoring scenario. AOIs 
included connections, input fields, entry values, actual and 
target values. Then, for each automation failure within a 
scenario, selected AOIs were defined as relevant (‘relevant 
AOIs’). Thus, the status of AOIs changed from being 
irrelevant to relevant.  
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Figure 3. Definition of all AOIs (dark grey) and AOIs defined as 
relevant (light grey) exemplified by a time unit an automation 
failure occurred in the right area of the bottom system  
The definition of time frames for the organization of eye-
tracking data was guided by instances of automation 
failure. Figure 4 shows how instances of automation failure 
are related to corresponding eye movements. Once the 
automatic system began to control the traffic dynamically, 
eye movement parameters for all stages of an automation 
failure were defined – before, during, and after the 
automation failure occurs: two time units before (-2), one 
time unit before (-1), when the automation failure occurs 
(0), one time unit after (+1), and two time units after the 
automation failure (+2). Additionally, the eye tracking data 
on relevant AOIs within the orientation phase (OP) were 
analyzed separately. 
automation 
failure 2
automation 
failure 1
simulation static simulation dynamic
-2   -1   0  +1  +2 -2   -1   0  +1  +2
scenario events 
eye movements
OP
Figure 4. The link between system events and the corresponding 
eye-tracking data exemplified by a scenario with two automation 
failures 
Eye Tracking Parameters 
In relation to the predefined AOIs and monitoring phases, 
the following eye tracking parameters were analyzed: 
• Total time until the first fixation: Time (in ms) until 
the first fixation falls on a relevant AOI within a time 
unit (tttff). 
• Total fixation count: Number of fixations on relevant 
AOIs (tfc). 
• Relative fixation count: The ratio between the number 
of fixations on relevant AOIs and all fixations within a 
time unit (rfc).  
• Total mean fixation duration: Mean fixation duration 
on a relevant AOI and all mean fixation duration 
within a time unit (tmfd). 
• Relative mean fixation duration: The ratio between 
mean fixation duration on a relevant AOI and all mean 
fixation duration within a time unit (rmfd). 
• Total gaze duration: Total duration of all gazes on 
relevant AOIs (tgd).  
• Relative gaze duration: The ratio between gaze 
duration on relevant AOIs and all gaze durations 
within a time unit (rgd).  
Relative parameters ranged from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating 
that no eye movements fell on predefined AOIs in relation 
to all eye movements within a time period, and with 1 
indicating that all eye movements fell on the predefined 
AOIs within a time period.  
RESULTS 
Data from 101 subjects were reported, each of whom 
processed six scenarios with a total of nine automation 
failures.  In sum, eye-tracking data and failure-detection 
data from 761 automation failures were included in the 
statistical analyses. Data were excluded when the 
corresponding eye tracking data were missing (16.3%).   
Predictability of automation failure detection by eye 
tracking data  
To address the first research question, a logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to predict the detection of 
automation failures when monitoring automation failures 
(using the eye movements on relevant AOIs as a predictor). 
In the contingency table (see Table 1) the outcome variable 
“failure detection performance” (failure reported versus 
failure not reported) is paired with the predictor variable 
“monitoring of automation failure” (automation failure 
detected or not detected) predicted by the eye movements 
on relevant AOIs. The regression model predicted the 
failure detection performance using seven eye tracking 
parameters (tttff, tfc, rfc, tmfd, rmfd, tgd, rgd) and six 
stages of an automation failure (OP, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2).    
A test of the full model against a constant only model was 
statistically significant, indicating that the monitoring of 
automation failures measured by eye movements on 
relevant AOIs as a set reliably distinguished between 
accurate failure-detection and failures not detected (chi 
square = 288.227, p < .001 with df = 42). Nagelkerke’s R2 
of .422 indicated a moderately good relationship between 
prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 
76.1% (78.8% for successful detection and 73.4% for 
missed failures).  
 
Table 1. Contingency table consisting of outcome variable 
“failure detection performance” paired with predictor variable 
“monitoring of automation failure” measured by eye movements  
 predictor  monitoring of automation failure 
percentage 
correct 
 
outcome 
 
automation 
failure 
NOT 
detected 
automation 
failure 
detected 
failure 
detection 
performance  
automation 
failure 
NOT 
reported 
276 100 73.4 
automation 
failure 
reported 
81 301 78.8 
overall percentage   76.1 
 
Looking-but-not-seeing effect 
To take a closer look to the looking-but-not-seeing effect, 
accurate failure-detection and missed failures were paired 
with relative fixation counts on relevant AOIs, but only for 
the time unit in which the automation failure occurs 
(TU=0). Table 2 contains the contingencies between 
failure-detection performance and monitoring the 
automation failures.  
A test of the full model against a constant only model was 
statistically significant (chi square = 156,866, p < .001 with 
df = 1). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .248 indicated a low correlation 
between prediction and grouping. Prediction success 
overall was 67.3% (97.0% for success and 37.1% for 
missing).  
Table 2. Contingency table consisting of failure detection 
performance paired with “monitoring of automation failure” 
measured by relative fixation counts only for the time unit in 
which the automation failure just occurs (TU=0). 
   monitoring of automation failure 
percentage 
correct 
 
 
 
NO eye 
movements 
on relevant 
AOIs 
eye 
movements 
on relevant 
AOIs 
failure 
detection 
performance  
failure 
NOT 
reported  
140 237 37.1 
automation 
failure 
reported 
12 372 97.0 
 overall percentage   67.3 
 
The data show substantial differences between accurate 
failure detection and missed failures. Using monitoring 
behavior to predict accurate failure detection was very 
reliable: 97 percent of accurately detected failures were 
able to be predicted from eye movement patterns. However, 
it was not possible to predict missed automation failures 
from eye movement patterns: 62.9 percent of missed 
automation failures were monitored, e.g. eye movements 
were measured on relevant AOIs when the automation 
failure happened, but the failure was not reported. 
DISCUSSION  
To address the differences in monitoring behavior between 
detected automation failures and those that were missed, 
this study analyzed monitoring behavior within a simplified 
and abstract simulation. In the present study, the eye 
movement behavior was be traced in detail, i.e. with respect 
to specific monitoring behavior around the time that the 
automation failure occurs. 
About three quarters of automation failure detections were 
predicted successfully by the corresponding eye 
movements. If the eye movement patterns for successful 
failure detection occurred, the automation failure was 
monitored and detected. Similarly, if eye movement 
patterns related to the error of omission were found, the 
automation failure was not monitored and not detected.  
This leads to the conclusion that human operators’ 
monitoring patterns are a useful indicator for their success 
in the detection of automation failures. Using MonT in 
combination with eye tracking data provides a useful, 
objective test for future personnel selection. As eye 
movements are operational measures of immediate 
cognitive processes [16], the test outcome cannot be faked. 
However about one fifth of the automation failures were 
not classified correctly from the corresponding eye 
movements. Two types of discrepancies between 
monitoring behavior and detection performance happened:  
1. The automation failure was NOT monitored but 
detected.  
2. The automation failure was monitored but NOT 
detected.   
Discrepancy 1 could be seen in light of peripheral target 
detection [7], i.e. eye tracking measures fixations, and 
therefore does not capture peripheral vision. Discrepancy 1 
may also be affected by methodological shortcomings 
concerning the definition of relevant AOIs for failure 
detection. As mentioned in the measurements section, it 
was defined WHEN (in which specific time unit) human 
operators should pay attention to WHAT (which certain 
areas) to detect the automation failure. Therefore, 
discrepancy 1 can be an effect of the individual differences 
in the timing of fixating on relevant information. Thus, the 
predictive value should be improved by adjusting the 
definition of AOIs which are relevant to detect automation 
failures.  
Discrepancy 2 can be interpreted as the result of the 
looking-but-not-seeing effect [20]. The human operator 
looks at information relevant for identifying an automation 
failure, but fails to detect the automation failure. A reason 
could be that human operators overlook the automation 
failure if they do not expect an automation failure. In line 
with Maples et al. (2008), this may reflect a side effect of 
top-down processing based on the expectations made 
during the orientation phase [21]. The looking-but-not-
seeing effect could also be caused by parallel tasks which 
are typical for complex human-machine systems. Human 
operators performing another task look at but do not 
recognize information unrelated to the task they are 
currently occupied with [6]. In the present study, this could 
be the case, as the participants had to monitor an automated 
system that sometimes had overlapping actions. 
However, when predicting failure detection using eye 
tracking data only for the time unit when the automation 
failure occurs, the proportion of discrepancy 1 decreases (to 
under 5%), but the proportion of discrepancy 2 increases 
(to over 60%). This clearly shows that it is important to 
include the monitoring behavior before, during, and after an 
automation failure in order to reliably predict failure 
detection. This is noteworthy considering that missing an 
automation failure (discrepancy 2) has more severe 
consequences than discrepancy 1.  
OUTLOOK 
Predicting failure detection by using eye tracking within 
dynamic simulations is an innovative strategy and enables 
the development of new approaches for personnel selection, 
training, and incident reports. Learning from the 
differences in monitoring automated systems between 
successful and unsuccessful failure detection will be 
helpful in learning how to select successful trainees and 
providing them with appropriate training.  
Nevertheless, discrepancies between eye-tracking 
indicators and failure detection shows still some methodical 
shortcomings of predicting automation failures based on 
human operators’ eye movements. Further research will 
improve the reliability of eye-movement indicators by 
adjusting the definition of information that is relevant for 
detecting automation failures. This includes WHEN (in 
which specific time unit) human operators should pay 
attention to WHAT (which certain areas) to detect the 
automation failure. These improvements further calibrate 
the diagnostic relevance of eye tracking when predicting 
the detection of automation failures based on human 
operators’ eye movements. 
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